


# A Logic for Hybrid Rules

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
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Combine **rules with negation as failure** with **classical theories**:

- **Hyrid KB** approaches rely on (variants of) the Answer Set Semantics. [Rosati,2005/2005b/2006, Heymans, et al. 2006]
- All give a **modular definition** of models by projection+reduct.
- Driven by decidability concerns: Defined for **syntactically limited** programs/FOL theories

We might have some other Questions:



- Can we **generalize** these combinations in a (non-classical) logic, i.e. with a **non-modular** model definition?
- Does this provide us with **notions of equivalence** commonly used (strong equivalence, uniform equivalence, etc.)?

$\mathcal{K} = (\mathcal{T}, \mathcal{P})$  hybrid knowledge base:

- classical first-order theory  $\mathcal{T}$  over function-free language  $\mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{T}} = \langle C, P_{\mathcal{T}} \rangle$
- a logic program  $\mathcal{P}$  over function-free language  $\mathcal{L} = \langle C, P_{\mathcal{T}} \cup P_{\mathcal{P}} \rangle$ , i.e. a set of rules:

$$a_1 \vee a_2 \vee \dots \vee a_k \vee \neg a_{k+1} \vee \dots \vee \neg a_l \leftarrow b_1, \dots, b_m, \neg b_{m+1}, \dots, \neg b_n$$

where  $P_{\mathcal{T}} \cap P_{\mathcal{P}} = \emptyset$

Note:

- $\mathcal{T}$  and  $\mathcal{P}$  talk about the same constants, and
- allowed predicate symbols in  $\mathcal{P}$  are a superset of the predicate symbols in  $\mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{T}}$ .

Overall idea for a nonmonotonic semantics: “evaluate”  $\mathcal{P}$  wrt a classical model of the theory and then compute stable models.

Let  $\mathcal{P}$  be a *ground* program and  $\mathcal{I} = \langle U, I \rangle$  an  $\mathcal{L}$ -structure, with  $U = (D, \sigma)$ .

$\Pi(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{I})$ , the **projection** of  $\mathcal{P}$  wrt  $\mathcal{I}$ , obtained by

- 1 deleting each rule with **head** literal  $p(t)$  (or  $\neg p(t)$ ) over  $At_D(C, P_T)$  such that  $p(\sigma(t)) \in I$  (or  $p(\sigma(t)) \notin I$ )
- 2 deleting each rule with **body** literal  $p(t)$  (or  $\neg p(t)$ ) over  $At_D(C, P_T)$  such that  $p(\sigma(t)) \notin I$  (or  $p(\sigma(t)) \in I$ );

and deleting occurrences of literals from  $\mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{I}}$  from remaining rules.

Overall idea for a nonmonotonic semantics: “evaluate”  $\mathcal{P}$  wrt a classical model of the theory and **then compute stable models**.

Let  $\mathcal{K} = (\mathcal{T}, \mathcal{P})$  be a hybrid knowledge base. An **NM-model**  $\mathcal{M} = \langle U, I \rangle$  of a hybrid knowledge base  $\mathcal{K}$  is a first-order  $\mathcal{L}$ -structure such that

- 1  $\mathcal{M}|_{\mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{T}}}$  is a model of  $\mathcal{T}$  and
- 2  $\mathcal{M}|_{\mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{P}}}$  is a stable model set of  $\Pi(\text{gr}_U(\mathcal{P}), \mathcal{M}|_{\mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{T}}})$ , i.e.  $\mathcal{M}|_{\mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{P}}}$  is a minimal Herbrand Model of the **reduct**  $\Pi(\text{gr}_U(\mathcal{P}), \mathcal{M})^{\mathcal{M}|_{\mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{P}}}}$ , obtained by taking all rules:
  - such that  $\mathcal{M}|_{\mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{P}}} \models a_i$  for negative head atoms  $a_i$  and
  - $\mathcal{I} \not\models b_j$  for all negative body atoms  $b_j$ .

Let  $\mathcal{K} = (\mathcal{T}, \mathcal{P})$  with

$\mathcal{T}$ : Each foaf:Person is a foaf:Agent:

$\forall x. PERSON(x) \rightarrow AGENT(x)$

$AGENT(David)$

$\mathcal{P}$ : Some nonmonotonic rule on top

$PERSON(x) \leftarrow pcmember(x, LPNMR), AGENT(x), \neg machine(x)$

$pcmember(David, LPNMR)$

Is David a PERSON?

Classical models of  $\mathcal{T}$ :

$\forall x. PERSON(x) \rightarrow AGENT(x)$   
 $AGENT(David)$

$\mathcal{M}_1|_{\mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{T}}} = \{AGENT(David), \neg PERSON(David), \neg AGENT(LPNMR), \dots\}$

$\mathcal{M}_2|_{\mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{T}}} = \{AGENT(David), PERSON(David), \neg AGENT(LPNMR), \dots\}$

$gr_U(\mathcal{P})$

$PERSON(David) \leftarrow$   
 $pcmember(David, LPNMR), AGENT(David), \neg machine(David)$   
 $PERSON(LPNMR) \leftarrow$   
 $pcmember(LPNMR, LPNMR), AGENT(LPNMR), \neg machine(LPNMR)$   
 $pcmember(David, LPNMR)$

Is David a PERSON?



Classical models of  $\mathcal{T}$ :

$\forall x. PERSON(x) \rightarrow AGENT(x)$   
 $AGENT(David)$

$\mathcal{M}_1|_{\mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{T}}} = \{AGENT(David), \neg PERSON(David), \neg AGENT(LPNMR), \dots\}$

$\mathcal{M}_2|_{\mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{T}}} = \{AGENT(David), PERSON(David), \neg AGENT(LPNMR), \dots\}$

$\Pi(gr_U(\mathcal{P}), \mathcal{M}_1|_{\mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{T}}})$

$\leftarrow pcmember(David, LPNMR), \neg machine(David).$

$pcmember(David, LPNMR)$

No stable models!

Is David a PERSON?

Classical models of  $\mathcal{T}$ :

$\forall x. PERSON(x) \rightarrow AGENT(x)$

$AGENT(David)$

$\mathcal{M}_1|_{\mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{T}}} = \{AGENT(David), \neg PERSON(David), \neg AGENT(LPNMR), \dots\}$

$\mathcal{M}_2|_{\mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{T}}} = \{AGENT(David), PERSON(David), \neg AGENT(LPNMR), \dots\}$

$\Pi(gr_U(\mathcal{P}), \mathcal{M}_2|_{\mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{T}}})$

$pcmember(David, LPNMR)$

One stable model...

Is David a PERSON? **Yes!**

$PERSON(David)$  in all NM-models, i.e.  $\mathcal{K} \models_{NM} PERSON(David)$

- *Equilibrium logic* (Pearce, 1997) generalises stable model semantics and answer set semantics for logic programs to arbitrary propositional theories.
- It is a nonmonotonic extension of the logic of [Here-and-there](#) with strong negation.
- Model theory based on Kripke semantics for intuitionistic logic
- We need a first-order version here...

- **QHT<sup>S</sup>** is complete for linear Kripke frames with two worlds “here” and “there” with a “static” domain over both worlds:  $h \leq t$ .
- **here-and-there structures**:  $\mathcal{M} = \langle (D, \sigma), I_h, I_t \rangle$
- $I_h, I_t$  are first-order-interpretations over  $D$  such that  $I_h \subseteq I_t$ .

The models are extended to all formulas via the rules known in intuitionistic logic, notions of validity and logical consequence relation are the ones for (intuitionistic) Kripke semantics.

For  $w \in \{h, t\}$ :

- $\mathcal{M}, w \models \varphi \wedge \psi$  iff  $\mathcal{M}, w \models \varphi$  and  $\mathcal{M}, w \models \psi$ .
- $\mathcal{M}, w \models \varphi \vee \psi$  iff  $\mathcal{M}, w \models \varphi$  or  $\mathcal{M}, w \models \psi$ .
- $\mathcal{M}, t \models \varphi \rightarrow \psi$  iff  $\mathcal{M}, t \not\models \varphi$  or  $\mathcal{M}, t \models \psi$ .
- $\mathcal{M}, h \models \varphi \rightarrow \psi$  iff  $\mathcal{M}, t \models \varphi \rightarrow \psi$  and  $\mathcal{M}, h \not\models \varphi$  or  $\mathcal{M}, h \models \psi$ .
- $\mathcal{M}, w \models \neg\varphi$  iff  $\mathcal{M}, t \not\models \varphi$ .
- $\mathcal{M}, t \models \forall x\varphi(x)$  iff  $\mathcal{M}, t \models \varphi(d)$  for all  $d \in D$ .
- $\mathcal{M}, h \models \forall x\varphi(x)$  iff  $\mathcal{M}, t \models \forall x\varphi(x)$  and  $\mathcal{M}, h \models \varphi(d)$  for all  $d \in D$ .
- $\mathcal{M}, w \models \exists x\varphi(x)$  iff  $\mathcal{M}, w \models \varphi(d)$  for some  $d \in D$ .

- We write  $\text{QHT}^s$ -structures more briefly as ordered pairs of atoms  $\langle H, T \rangle$ , with  $H \subseteq T$ .
- An  $\text{QHT}^s$ -Structure  $\langle H, T \rangle$  is said to be **total** if  $H = T$
- Order relation:  $\langle H, T \rangle \trianglelefteq \langle H', T' \rangle$  if  $T = T'$  and  $H \subseteq H'$
- $\langle H, T \rangle$  is an **equilibrium model** of  $\Pi$  if is
  - (i)  $\langle H, T \rangle$  minimal under  $\trianglelefteq$ , and
  - (ii)  $\langle H, T \rangle$  is total.

**QEL** is determined by the equilibrium models of a theory.

- Equilibrium Logic generalises Answer Set semantics for arbitrary formulae (including disjunctive and nested programs)
- Any rule

$$a_1 \vee a_2 \vee \dots \vee a_k \vee \neg a_{k+1} \vee \dots \vee \neg a_l \leftarrow b_1, \dots, b_m, \neg b_{m+1}, \dots, \neg b_n$$

is just treated as (universally closed) formula in QEL:

$$(\forall) a_1 \vee a_2 \vee \dots \vee a_k \vee \neg a_{k+1} \vee \dots \vee \neg a_l \leftarrow b_1 \wedge \dots \wedge b_m \wedge \neg b_{m+1} \wedge \dots \wedge \neg b_n$$

- Equilibrium models correspond to (open) answer sets:  $\langle T, T \rangle$  is a equilibrium model of  $\mathcal{P}$  iff  $T$  is an answer set of  $\Pi$ .
- So, for  $\mathcal{K} = (\emptyset, P)$  answer sets and QEL-models correspond!

UNA [Pearce&Valverde, 2005] and non-UNA [Pearce&Valverde, 2006] versions of QEL available.

Q: Does the correspondence extend to hybrid KBs? Yes!

**Idea:** define embedding based on the observation that adding LEM makes intuitionistic logic classical!

Given a hybrid KB  $\mathcal{K} = (\mathcal{T}, \mathcal{P})$  we call  $\mathcal{T} \cup st(\mathcal{T}) \cup \mathcal{P}$  the *stable closure* of  $\mathcal{K}$ , where  $st(\mathcal{T}) = \{\forall x(p(x) \vee \neg p(x)) : p \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{T}}\}$ .

Wake up! Main theorem of the paper!!! ;-)

### Theorem

*Let  $\mathcal{K} = (\mathcal{T}, \mathcal{P})$  be a hybrid knowledge base. Let  $\mathcal{M} = \langle U, T, T \rangle$  be a total here-and-there model of the stable closure of  $\mathcal{K}$ . Then  $\mathcal{M}$  is an equilibrium model if and only if it is an NM-model of  $\mathcal{K}$ .*



## Example - stable closure of $\mathcal{K}$ :

$$st(\mathcal{K}) = \mathcal{T} \cup st(\mathcal{T}) \cup \mathcal{P}$$

$\forall x.PERSON(x) \rightarrow AGENT(x)$

$AGENT(David)$

$\forall x.PERSON(x) \vee \neg PERSON(x)$

$\forall x.AGENT(x) \vee \neg AGENT(x)$

$\forall x.PERSON(x) \leftarrow pcmember(x, LPNMR) \wedge AGENT(x) \wedge \neg machine(x)$

$pcmember(David, LPNMR)$

There IS a classical model of this theory

$$\mathcal{M} = \{\neg PERSON(David), machine(David), \dots\}$$

Thus:

$$K \not\models_{FOL} PERSON(David)$$

## Example - stable closure of $\mathcal{K}$ :

$$st(\mathcal{K}) = \mathcal{T} \cup st(\mathcal{T}) \cup \mathcal{P}$$

$$\forall x. PERSON(x) \rightarrow AGENT(x)$$

$$AGENT(David)$$

$$\forall x. PERSON(x) \vee \neg PERSON(x)$$

$$\forall x. AGENT(x) \vee \neg AGENT(x)$$

$$\forall x. PERSON(x) \leftarrow pcmember(x, LPNMR), AGENT(x) \wedge \neg machine(x)$$

$$pcmember(David, LPNMR)$$

The total HT-model  $\mathcal{M}_{HT} = \langle H, T \rangle$  corresponding to  $\mathcal{M}$  with:  
 $H = T = \{machine(David), \dots\}$

is NO Equilibrium model, since there is a model  $\mathcal{M}'_{HT} \triangleleft \mathcal{M}_{HT}$ :

$$\text{with: } H' = \{\dots\}$$

$$T = \{machine(David), \dots\}$$

All Equilibrium models include  $PERSON(David)$ , thus:

$$st(\mathcal{K}) \models_{QEL} PERSON(David) \checkmark$$

- Quantified Equilibrium Logic provides a powerful and intuitive tool as a “carrier” logic for Hybrid KBs
- Embedding is simple: add LEM for classical predicates.
- Why this works is not so surprising:  $QHT^s$  based on intuitionistic logic, adding LEM enforces totalization of HT models on the respective predicates, i.e. make them “classical”.
- No reducts involved, this gives us:
  - a semantics for nested logic programs. Well-investigated for propositional LPs, first-order case needs more investigation, respective results on QEL relatively new.
  - results on strong equivalence for Equilibrium Logic carry over: HT-model equivalence amounts to strong equivalence! Important notion for nonmonotonic logic programs, program optimization, meaning preserving transformations of hybrid KB's, etc.

- Paper covers only equality-free FOL embedding (results already there in [Pearce&Valverde, 2006])
- Investigation on related (IJCAI) approaches:
  - Logic of minimal knowledge and negation as failure (MKNF) [Motik & Rosati, 2007]
  - First-Order Autoepistemic Logic [de Bruijn et al., 2007]
  - Circumscription [Ferraris et al., 2007]